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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
Special Term granted petitioner's application, but the Appellate Division
reversed the order and dismissed the petition, as did the Court of Appeals by
a unanimous vote.
Although the Court held that the sale was not within the regular course
of business, they denied petitioner's suit on the ground that Section 20 did
not apply to circumstances such as those in the present case.
The purpose of Section 20 as announced in In re Timmis, was to protect
the minority stockholders from requiring them to abandon, change, or limit
their business, if the majority should have the power to direct such a sale.36
However, where a minority stockholder agreed to the sale of the assets
pursuant to a plan of dissoultion, he is no longer a party that was intended
to be protected by Section 20. Thus, the Court held that once a stockholder
has agreed to a sale of substantially all the assets of a corporation, he no
longer has rights under Section 20, but his remedy lies elsewhere.
It seems clear that had petitioner been faced with a resoultion of sale
alone, his vote would have been negative to such an idea, and his rights
established under Section 20. Because of the adition of the further provision
of dissolution combined with the sale, his affirmative vote deleted his rights
under Section 20. Queare whether the remedies now available to petitioner,
if any, are sufficient to offset the loss of his remedy at hand, and, if not, did
the legislature really intend that his minority interest should be impaired
at the hands of the majority stockholders pursuant to a resolution that
was proposed primarily to get the minority vote, thus vitiating the effect of
Section 20.W Would this not be contrary to the purpose of Section 20 as
38
already established in the Timmis case?

CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
FEDERAL v. STATE DETERMINATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS SUBJECT TO FEDERAL

LIENS

In In re Washington Square Slum Clearance1 there occurred in sequence:
(1) an attorney's retainer contract was signed by the client providing that
the client agreed "to pay and do hereby assign" twenty per cent of any
award to be made for the attorney's services in representing the client in a
holders at a regularly called stockholders meeting where there is a sale of substantially all
the assets of a corporation, not made in the regular course of business.
Section 45 N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW requires that whenever, under this law, stockholders
are required to take any action at a regularly called meeting, written, notice of the meeting
must be sent to each stockholder entitled to vote at such a meeting, informing him of the
time and place of the meeting, and its purpose.
36. In re Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910).
37. It should be noted that there was no allegation of fraud in the present case.
The writer offers the above explanation to show how the Court's interpretation here
offers an opportunity, in future cases, to the majority to defraud the minority stockholders.
38. Supra note 36.
1.

5 N.Y.2d 300S,184 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1959).
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condemnation proceeding, (2) the attorney fully performed the services,
and the condemnation order was entered, (3) the Federal Government duly
filed a tax lien against the client, and (4) the final decree of condemnation
granting the award was signed. The attorney moved at Special Term to have
his lien enforced out of the condemnation award fund held by the condemnor.
The Federal Government intervened, asserting the priority of its lien.
Had the attorney asserted the priority of his lien, the Government's
lien would have had priority.2 Rather, the attorney claimed that under
State law the asignment to him of the twenty per cent interest in the award
under the retainer contract operated as a purchase by him of that interest at
the time the contract was signed, and therefore, the Government's lien could
not attach to his interest since it was directed against property owned only
by the client. The Government contended that the attorney was attempting
to except himself from the Government's lien by showing that he purchased
the property in dispute, that whether he was a "purchaser" is a question of
Federal and not State determination, that he was not a purchaser by Federal
standards because the contractual agreement did not evidence the normal
attributes of a conventional purchase, and, therefore, the Government's
lien could attach to his interest.
The Court of Appeals held that prior to the attachment of the Government's lien the attorney acquired, under New York law, a property interest
in the award, 3 which, when the Government filed its lien, could not be disturbed by the client. Since that Government lien could only attach to the
client's property,4 as ascertained by State law,5 the attorney's property interest
was free of the lien. The Court reasoned that since the property interest
passed to the attorney prior to the attachment of the Government lien, there
could be no contention by the Government that its lien was being sabotaged.
judge Fuld dissented on the ground that the purchase was not operative
until the attorney's property interest became choate, which was subsequent
to the attachment of the Government's lien. Until the order of condemnation
was entered, the attorney had no more interest than his statutory lien granted
him.6 Since the property interest did not in fact pass until after the Govern2. Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y.2d 511, 169 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957); United States
v. Pay-O-Matic Corp., 162 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Goldstein, 256
F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
3. There is apparently no dispute that the attorney's lien interest is property. While
the Court assumes that it is property and rights to property, there is, however, no authority
suggesting the validity of the assumption.
4. INr. R v. CoDE or 1954 § 6321 provides that a lien against a taxpayer "shall
be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to such person." § 6323 provides that the lien imposed under
Section 6321 "shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
"
creditor until notice thereof has been filed ....
5. Commission v. Stem, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1959); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United
States, 4 N.Y.2d 639, 176 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1958); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v.
New York City Housing Authority, 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
6. N.Y. JunicCARY LAW § 475 provides that an attorney has a lien on his client's
cause of action which attaches to the judgment from the commencement of the action,
which lien is extant to the value of the services rendered.

106

COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
ment's lien attached, whether the attorney was a "purchaser" must be
Federally determined,7 and the attorney was not a conventional purchaser
as he must be to satisfy the Federal determination.8
The policy underlying the Court's decision is that the Government, when
it proceeds in a State court asserting an interest against the taxpayer's property, is in no better position as claimant because it is the Government. This
is so because there is no requirement that the States uniformly determine
whether a particular interest is property and whether it belongs to the taxpayer
in a given instance. 9
There is, however, the competing policy that the words "mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor," as set forth in the Federal statute
as classes excepted from the liens under defined circumstances, should be
uniformly interpreted by the States to prevent any State from expanding its
definition of any of these exceptions to impede the imposition of Federal
liens. 10 The result obtained apparently enables New York State to accomplish
the very thing sought to be prevented.
This decision poses the anomaly of irreconcilable policies basic to
Federal lien statutes clashing within the same case. It is suggested that
this Court was not without a choice in reaching its result, and that it characterized the issues to reach the result favorable to the State's interest in
protecting an attorney's lien.
The Court avoids the Federal constitutional issue present in the case.
If Federal liens can reach and confiscate a property interest which, under
State law, is no longer owned by the taxpayer, is there not a taking of
property without due process of law?
THnD PARTY RESTRAINING ORDER IN SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS
Section 781 of the New York Civil Practice Act provides that: "Upon
the service of the subpoena upon any third party who has in his or its
possession property or moneys belonging to the judgment debtor or who is
indebted to the judgment debtor, such . . . third party is hereby forbidden to
make or suffer any transfer or other disposition of, . . ." such property. A
violation of the above restraining provision is punishable as a contempt of
court, by either a fine or inprisonment.
"Proceedings supplementary to a judgment in this state furnish a substitute for the creditor's bill formerly used in aid of execution to reach
intangible assets of the debtor. The service of the third party subpoena ...
gives the judgment creditor the priority of a vigilant creditor and a lien upon
7. United States v. Scovill, 348 US. 218 (1955); In re Litt, 128 F. Supp. 34 (D.C.
Pa. 1955). See also United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953);
United States v. Kings County Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
8. United States v. Scovill, supra note 7; In re Litt, supra note 7; United States
v. R. F. Ball Const. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
9. Commissioner v. Stem, supra note 5, at 44-45, 47.
10. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., supra note 7.
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